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“The only consistency that we can see in the government’s treatment of the meaning of
‘aggravated felony’ is that the alien always loses.”1
Jose Guerrero entered the United States with his parents as a lawful perma-
nent resident when he was two-months-old.2  Twenty years later, he pled guilty
in an Illinois state court to criminal sexual abuse for having sex with his under-
age girlfriend.3  Guerrero received a misdemeanor conviction for his actions, and
the judge sentenced him to just thirty days work release and two years of sex
offender probation.4  Shortly after his criminal trial, Guerrero was brought
before an immigration judge.5  Even though Guerrero had been convicted of a
misdemeanor, and not a felony, the immigration judge concluded that Guerrero
had committed the “aggravated felony” of “sexual abuse of a minor.”6  As a result,
the government deported Guerrero to Mexico and permanently barred him from
returning to the United States.7
This note contends that the crime of sexual abuse of a minor should only be
considered an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”)8 if the underlying offense satisfies the federal definition of a felony, i.e.,
it is punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.  Because a non-citizen
who commits an aggravated felony is deportable and barred from re-entering the
country without first receiving special permission from the attorney general, it is
likely that Congress did not intend misdemeanor sexual abuse to qualify as an
“aggravated felony” under the INA.  However, three United States Circuit
Courts of Appeals—the Sixth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, and the Eleventh
Circuit—and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), have concluded that
Congress intended this result.  To reach this conclusion, these courts relied on
creative arguments to avoid the ordinary meaning of the terms “aggravated” and
“felony.”  In addition, the plain language of the aggravated felony provision, cou-
pled with its legislative history, suggests that misdemeanor sexual abuse cannot
constitute the aggravated felony of sexual abuse of a minor.  Moreover, in two
recent decisions, the Supreme Court has applied an ordinary meaning approach
in defining the scope of other parts of the aggravated felony provision.  Giving
the words “aggravated” and “felony” their ordinary meaning further supports the
conclusion that only felony offenses should constitute the aggravated felony of sex-
ual abuse of a minor.
1. Gonzalez-Gomez v. Achim, 441 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 2006).
2. Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727, 728 (7th Cir. 2001).
3. Id. at 730.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 737.
8. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000)).
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Part I of this note will trace the history of criminal deportation in this coun-
try, focusing on the aggravated felony provision and the harsh consequences that
follow an aggravated felony conviction.  Part II will discuss the line of cases that
conclude that misdemeanor offenses involving sexual abuse of a minor qualify as
aggravated felonies.  Part III will discuss two recent Supreme Court decisions in
which the Court applied an ordinary meaning approach in interpreting the scope
of the aggravated felony provision.  It will further argue that lower courts should
apply this approach when interpreting the meaning of the sexual abuse of a mi-
nor subparagraph.  Part IV will conclude that the aggravated felony of sexual
abuse of a minor should include only felony offenses.
I. HISTORY OF CRIMINAL DEPORTATION AND THE AGGRAVATED FELONY
PROVISION
Congress did very little to regulate the immigration of aliens convicted of
crimes throughout most of the nineteenth century.9  During the twentieth cen-
tury, however, Congress steadily increased the crime-related grounds for deporta-
tion.10  Today, one of the largest categories of deportable offenses is crimes known
as “aggravated felonies.”11  A conviction for an aggravated felony results in harsh
consequences for non-citizens, including deportation and a permanent bar from
returning to the country without the attorney general’s consent to apply for
readmission.12
A. The Evolution of Deportation Statutes Based on Criminal
Activity
Deportation (now referred to as removal)13 has traditionally been defined as
the removal of a non-citizen who has entered the United States, legally or ille-
9. Melissa Cook, Note, Banished For Minor Crimes: The Aggravated Felony Provision of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act as a Human Rights Violation, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 293, 296–97
(2003).
10. Id. at 298.
11. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 567
(5th ed. 2003).
12. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2000); INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)
(9)(A)(i) (2000); Cook, supra note 9, at 298.
13. Prior to 1996, the INA provided for two different proceedings: deportation proceedings for removing
aliens who had entered the country and exclusion proceedings for aliens who were deemed inadmissible
(i.e., forbidden entry).  Stephen W. Yale-Loehr & Lindsay Schoonmaker, Overview of U.S. Immigration
Law, 1593 PRAC. L. INST. 9 (2007).  In 1996, Congress created “removal proceedings,” consolidating
deportation and exclusion proceedings. See  INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2000).  The INA, however,
continues to distinguish aliens who are deportable from aliens who are inadmissible. See  Stephen W.
Yale-Loehr & Lindsay Schoonmaker, Overview of U.S. Immigration Law, 1593 PRAC. L. INST. 9
(2007); INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2007).  This note, therefore, continues to use the term “deport”
and its derivatives to refer to the removal of aliens who have entered the United States.
421
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gally.14  The earliest deportation statutes appeared in the colonies.15  The first
federal deportation statute was enacted in 1798.16  The Alien and Sedition Acts
of 1798 gave the president the power to deport: (1) resident aliens who main-
tained citizenship of a country at war with the United States (enemy aliens), (2)
any alien whom he judged to be “dangerous to the peace and safety of the United
States,” and (3) any alien in prison.17  Only the power to remove enemy aliens is
still on the books today.18  The other powers granted under the acts were allowed
to expire after two years.19
For most of the nineteenth century, the federal government did little to reg-
ulate immigration.20  The nation had no general deportation statute, and non-
citizens who entered the country were allowed to stay as long as they wished.21
In the late 1800s, the federal government, through exclusion laws, began to im-
pose restrictions on who could enter the country.22  Shortly thereafter, Congress
recognized the need to remove non-citizens who had entered the country in vio-
lation of these restrictions.23  Thus, deportation statutes were initially viewed as
complements to the exclusion laws.24  Congress expanded the classes of excludable
aliens to include felons in 1891.25  At the same time, Congress provided that any
felon who entered the country in violation of the law would be deported within
one year of entry.26
In 1907, Congress authorized the deportation of any non-citizen who was a
prostitute “at any time within three years after she shall have entered the United
States.”27  Like the Alien and Sedition Act, this law authorized the deportation of
14. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 11, at 535.
15. Will Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 311–12 n.14 (1956). In
1639, Plymouth Colony created a statute providing for the deportation of paupers to Europe.  In 1647,
Massachusetts denied admission to Catholic priests and called for the deportation of any priests found in
the colony.  In 1740, Delaware ordered the deportation of criminals and paupers. Id. 
16. Alien Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (expired 1801).
17. Id.; Alien Enemy Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (repealed 1881).
18. 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–23 (2000).  In the 1940s, the statute was invoked to deport hundreds of Germans.
Maslow, supra note 15, at 312.
19. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 11, at 535.
20. Id.
21. Id.  However, during this time, the states sought to control the movement of criminals across state lines.
Several states passed laws excluding criminals who had been exiled from another country.  Others denied
entry to any individual—citizen or non-citizen—who had ever been convicted of a crime.  Cook, supra
note 9, at 296–97.
22. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 11, at 535.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Immigration Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084.
26. Id.
27. Alien Immigration Act of February 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 3, 34 Stat. 898, 899–900.
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a non-citizen based on conduct within the United States after he or she made a
lawful entry.28  Congress has continued to expand the list of post-entry crimes
that render a lawfully admitted alien deportable,29 all of which can now be found
in INA Section 237(2).30  This list currently includes: a single conviction of a
crime of moral turpitude committed within five years of admission, two or more
convictions of crimes of moral turpitude regardless of the length of the sentence,
aggravated felonies, high-speed flight from an immigration checkpoint, controlled
substance convictions, drug abuse or addiction, certain firearm offenses, espio-
nage, treason and sedition, crimes of domestic violence, stalking, violation of a
protection order, and child abuse.31
B. The Rule of Lenity
Commentators have long noted the harsh consequences of deportation.  Ar-
guing against the Alien and Sedition Acts, James Madison forcefully stated that:
If the banishment of an alien from a country into which he has been
invited as the asylum most auspicious to his happiness,—a country
where he may have formed the most tender connections; where he may
have invested his entire property, and acquired property of the real and
permanent, as well as the movable and temporary kind; where he en-
joys, under the laws, a greater share of the blessing of personal security,
and personal liberty, than he can elsewhere hope for. . . .  [I]f a banish-
ment of this sort be not a punishment, and among the severest of pun-
ishments, it will be difficult to imagine a doom to which the name can
be applied.32
The Supreme Court has also recognized the severe consequences associated
with deportation.33  As a result, the Court has a long history of interpreting
deportation statutes narrowly.34  Justice Douglas wrote the classic statement of
what is often referred to as the “rule of lenity”:
We resolve the doubts in favor of that construction [advocated by
the alien] because deportation is a drastic measure and at times the
equivalent of banishment or exile.  It is the forfeiture for misconduct in
this country.  Such a forfeiture is a penalty.  To construe this statutory
provision less generously to the alien might find support in logic.  But
since the stakes are considerable for the individual, we will not assume
28. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 11, at 536.
29. Id.
30. INA § 237(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2000).
31. Id .
32. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 11, at 539 (citing JONATHAN ELLIOT, 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 555 (1881)).
33. Id. at 550.
34. Id.
423
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that Congress meant to trench on his freedom beyond that which is
required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words
used.35
The Court has consistently maintained that deportation statutes must be
narrowly interpreted.36  In 1987, the Court referred to “the longstanding princi-
ple of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the
alien.”37  In 2001, the Court once again reaffirmed the validity of this canon of
interpretation.38  Indeed, the rule of lenity has been described as the “most impor-
tant rule of statutory interpretation peculiar to immigration.”39
C. The Aggravated Felony Provision
The concept of an aggravated felony has been of increasing importance in
the deportation context.40  Since Congress added the phrase to the INA in 1988,41
the definition of what constitutes an aggravated felony has steadily grown and
now includes conduct that is neither “aggravated” nor “felonious,” as those words
are commonly understood.42  In fact, several misdemeanors, including shoplifting
and simple battery, are now considered aggravated felonies for purposes of the
INA.43  As the definition of what constitutes an aggravated felony has grown
increasingly inclusive, the consequences of an aggravated felony conviction have
35. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (citation omitted).
36. See  Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 515, 519 (2003).
37. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987).
38. See  INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001).
39. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND
AMERICA 156 (1987).
40. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 11, at 567.  The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) decides
whether to seek to remove an alien.  The removal proceeding must be conducted by an immigration judge
in the Immigration Court (under the umbrella organization of the Executive Office for Immigration
Review (“EOIR”) of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)).  The DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment (“ICE”) division’s trial attorneys represent the government.  Non-citizens found removable by im-
migration judges have a right to appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which is composed
of board members appointed by the attorney general.  Under limited circumstances, aliens may seek judi-
cial review of an adverse decision of the BIA.  For example, Section 242 of the INA eliminates judicial
review of a removal order based on most crime-related deportation grounds, including aggravated felony
convictions.  However, the Supreme Court has interpreted Section 242 narrowly to leave open the possi-
bility of judicial review of pure questions of law raised by the alien. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 305; see
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 11, at 238–62 (providing a broader discussion of the agencies and courts
involved in the adjudication of a removal case).
41. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181 [hereinafter ADAA] (codi-
fied as amended at INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000)).  The ADAA defined the term as
“murder, any drug trafficking crime . . . or any illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices . . . or
any attempt or conspiracy to commit such an act.” Id.
42. Cook, supra note 9, at 298.
43. Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope
of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1939 (2000).
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grown increasingly harsh.  Aggravated felons are subject to mandatory detention
and expedited removal, are ineligible for most forms of discretionary relief, have
limited access to judicial review, and face a lifetime ban from reentering the
country.44  In 1996, Congress made these harsh consequences all the more potent
by applying the aggravated felony provisions retroactively.45
1. The Advent of the Aggravated Felony Provision:  The Anti-
Drug Abuse Act
Congress added the term “aggravated felony” to the INA in 1988 as part of
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (“ADAA”)46 in order to target crimes committed by
non-citizens involved in the drug trade,47 including murder, drug-trafficking,
and trafficking in firearms.48  The ADAA called for the deportation of any non-
citizen convicted of an aggravated felony any time after entry.49  The ADAA also
barred aggravated felons from re-entering the country for ten years.50  Further-
more, the ADAA created special deportation proceedings for aggravated felons51
and ordered the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”)52 to complete
deportation proceedings before the alien finished his term of imprisonment.53  If
the INS is unable to timely complete the deportation proceedings, the ADAA
instructs the attorney general to hold the aggravated felon in custody until
deportation.54
2. The Expansion Begins: The Immigration Act of 1990
The George H.W. Bush administration’s war on drugs and violent crime led
to an amendment of the aggravated felony provision in 1990.55  The Immigra-
44. See  discussion infra subsections 1–6.
45. Cook, supra note 9, at 309 (citing Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 321(b), 110 Stat. 3009-628 (1996) [hereinafter IIRIRA] (codified in scattered sections of
8 and 18 U.S.C. (2000))).
46. Id. (citing ADAA § 7342, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)).
47. Id. at 299.  Debates in the House of Representatives showed a concern over the number of drug-related
crimes committed by non-citizens. See generally 133 Cong. Rec. H8961 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1987) (state-
ment of Rep. Smith).  The debates also illustrated Congress’s concern that non-citizen felons were escaping
deportation. Id.
48. ADAA § 7342, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).
49. ADDA § 7344(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4).
50. ADDA § 7349, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(17).
51. ADDA §§ 7343(a), 7347, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a), 1228.
52. The INS now forms part of the Department of Homeland Security.  For a broader discussion of the federal
agencies and courts involved in the administration of the country’s immigration policy, see ALEINIKOFF
ET AL., supra note 11, at 238–62.
53. ADAA § 7347, 8 U.S.C. § 1228.
54. ADDA § 7343, 8 U.S.C. § 1228.
55. Cook, supra note 9, at 300.  At that time, Congress and the Bush administration continued to view the
aggravated felony provision as an important weapon in the war on drugs.  Between 1980 and 1990, the
425
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tion Act of 1990 significantly expanded the coverage of the aggravated felony
provision by adding lesser drug crimes and crimes of violence, for which the term
of imprisonment was five years, to the list of qualifying offenses.56  In addition,
it raised the bar for re-admission for aggravated felons from ten to twenty
years.57  Congress also made certain aggravated felons ineligible for discretionary
relief.  Prior to 1990, lawful permanent residents convicted of aggravated felo-
nies were eligible for an INA Section 212(c) waiver of deportation.58  The
waiver enabled the attorney general to cancel deportation after considering sev-
eral mitigating factors, including permanent residence status, length of residence
in the United States and the possible effect of deportation on the non-citizen’s
family.59  The Immigration Act of 1990, however, made aggravated felons im-
prisoned for more than five years ineligible for this form of relief, eliminating the
attorney general’s ability to consider mitigating factors in the cases of many ag-
gravated felons.60  In 1991, Congress further restricted the availability of Section
212(c) waivers by denying such relief to aliens convicted of multiple aggravated
felonies, regardless of the length of sentence.61
The unforgiving consequences of these changes are not difficult to imagine.
Take, for example, the case of Al Correa, who left Columbia with his family at
the age of two.62  He attended grade school and high school in Brooklyn, New
York and had begun attending college in Manhattan.63  Mr. Correa did not
speak Spanish, was employed, and had no prior police record.64  He was “totally
American” although “technically Columbian” because he had never applied to be-
come an American citizen.65  Nevertheless, Mr. Correa faced deportation as an
number of undocumented prisoners grew by 600 percent. Id. More than 80 percent of undocumented
prisoners had been convicted of narcotics violations. Id. at 300–01.  In his signing statement, President
Bush wrote, “[the aggravated felony expansion] meets several objectives of my Administration’s war on
drugs and violent crimes . . . [by providing] for the expeditious deportation of aliens who, by their violent
criminal acts, forfeit their right to remain in this country.  These offenders, comprising nearly a quarter of
our federal prison population, jeopardize the safety and well-being of every American resident.”  State-
ment on Signing the Immigration Act of 1990, PUB. PAPERS 1717–18 (Nov. 29, 1990).
56. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a) (2000)).
57. Immigration Act of 1990 § 514(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(17).
58. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1988).
59. Cook, supra note 9, at 301 (describing Section 212(c) discretionary waiver).
60. See id. at 303 (discussing section 511 of the Immigration Act of 1990).
61. Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Nationality Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–232,
§ 306(a)(10), 105 Stat. 1733, 1751 (1991).
62. Andrew Blake, Strict Deportation Laws Imperil an American Dream, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 28, 1990,
at 18.
63. Id .
64. Id.
65. Id.
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aggravated felon after pleading guilty to a federal charge of cocaine possession
with intent to distribute.66  The prosecutor in the case actually requested a mini-
mum sentence, acknowledging that Mr. Correa was the “smallest of small fry
offenders,” and “simply in the wrong place at the wrong time.”67  The arresting
detective in the case also stated that he did not believe Mr. Correa should be
deported.68  Unfortunately, the aforementioned changes to the aggravated felony
provision left the government “virtually no option even in cases like Mr. Cor-
rea’s” because Congress had made aggravated felons ineligible for virtually every
form of discretionary relief.69  The new and inflexible consequences of the aggra-
vated felony provision meant that Mr. Correa faced deportation to a land he
never knew.70
3. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
In 1995, the Oklahoma City bombing resulted in the death of 168 people.71
The vast majority of Americans initially believed that Middle-Eastern terrorists
were responsible for the tragic event, which led to a public outcry for stricter
immigration legislation preventing the admission of foreign terrorists.72  This
outcry, coupled with the fact that 1996 was an election year, resulted in the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).73  President
Clinton signed the bill into law, even though he recognized that the reactionary
legislation made “major, ill-advised changes in our immigration laws having
nothing to do with fighting terrorism.”74
The AEDPA added to the aggravated felony provision’s list of offenses sev-
eral less serious crimes, including: bribery, counterfeiting or mutilating a pass-
port, certain gambling offenses, obstruction of justice, and transportation for the
purpose of prostitution.75  The act also made aggravated felons ineligible for cer-
tain forms of discretionary relief.76  Under the Immigration Act of 1990, aggra-
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting Timothy Whelan, the district deputy director of the INS in Boston, Mass.).
70. Id.
71. Cook, supra note 9, at 303.
72. Id. at 303–04.  American terrorists actually carried out the attack.  See, e.g., William F. Woo, A Nation
No Longer Quite So Indivisible, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, May 7, 1995, at 1B.
73. Cook, supra note 9, at 304–05; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104–132, 110 Stat 1214, 1214 [hereinafter AEDPA] (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18,
22, 28, 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
74. Cook, supra note 9, at 305 (citing Editorial, A Terror of Law Series, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 18,
1996, at 14A).
75. AEDPA § 440(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).
76. AEDPA § 440(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c).
427
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vated felons imprisoned for less than five years could apply for the section 212(c)
waiver of deportation.77  The AEDPA, on the other hand, categorically denied
such relief to all aggravated felons.78
4. Retroactive Application: The Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act
Six months after the enactment of the AEDPA, Congress passed the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), which fur-
ther expanded the scope of the aggravated felony provision.79  The IIRIRA in-
cluded rape and sexual abuse of a minor as aggravated felonies.80  The IIRIRA
also significantly reduced monetary requirements for certain offenses included in
the aggravated felony provision.81  For example, prior to 1996, offenses involv-
ing fraud, deceit, or tax evasion qualified as aggravated felonies only when the
loss to the victim exceeded two hundred thousand dollars.82  The IIRIRA lowered
the requisite amount to ten thousand dollars.83  Congress made similar changes to
the sentencing requirements of certain crimes.84  Prior to 1996, crimes of vio-
lence, passport falsification, theft offenses, and alien smuggling offenses, all re-
quired a term of imprisonment of at least five years in order to qualify as
aggravated felonies.85 The IIRIRA reduced the requisite imprisonment to one
year.86  These reductions in monetary and sentencing requirements greatly ex-
panded the breadth of the aggravated felony provision.87  At the same time, the
IIRIRA prohibited an aggravated felon from ever returning to the country.88
Further, the IIRIRA removed a judge’s discretion in cases where criminal
conviction would result in deportation by redefining the terms “conviction” and
77. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 511, 104 Stat. 5052, (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(2)(B)
(2000)).
78. AEDPA § 440(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c).
79. IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321(a), 110 Stat. 3009–546 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)
(2000)).
80. IIRIRA § 321(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).
81. IIRIRA § 321(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43); Cook, supra note 9, at 307.
82. INA § 101(a)(43)(M), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M) (1988), amended by IIRIRA § 321(a)(7) (1996).
83. IIRIRA § 321(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).
84. Cook, supra note 9, at 307.
85. INA § 101(a)(43)(F)–(G), (N) & (P), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (1988), amended by IIRIRA § 321(a)(3)
(1996).
86. IIRIRA § 321(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).
87. Cook, supra note 9, at 307.
88. IIRIRA § 301(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1182.  The prohibition of re-admission had harsh consequences on the immi-
grant community.  For example, a lawful permanent resident who had lived in the country for twenty
years could suddenly be deported for shoplifting and banned from ever returning to the country.  Cook,
supra note 9, at 307 (citing Terry Coonan, Dolphins Caught in Congressional Fishnets—Immigra-
tion Law’s New Aggravated Felons, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 589, 605 (1998)).
428
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“term of imprisonment.”  Prior to the IIRIRA, the INA did not statutorily define
conviction.89  Instead, courts relied on the definition of conviction created by the
BIA in In re Ozkok.90  This definition allowed judges to defer adjudication,
issuing some form of probation instead.91  As long as the alien complied with the
terms of the probation, the conviction was never entered on the record and, conse-
quently, the alien was not deportable.92  Congress sought to eliminate this prac-
tice.93  To that end, the IIRIRA created INA section 101(a)(48), which provides
that a conviction still occurs even when a judge defers adjudication as long as
there are sufficient facts to establish guilt, and the judge has imposed some form
of punishment.94
The IIRIRA further restricted a sentencing judge’s discretion and ability to
avoid deportation of aggravated felons by redefining the phrase “term of impris-
onment.”  Prior to the IIRIRA, certain offenses required the imposition of a jail
term in order to qualify as aggravated felonies.95  Thus, judges could suspend
sentences in order to avoid deportation consequences.96  The IIRIRA ended this
practice by providing that “term of imprisonment” includes any period of time
that a sentence is suspended.97
89. See In re Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 551–52 (B.I.A. 1988) (judicially creating a definition for
conviction).
90. Cook, supra note 9, at 307; see In re Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 551–52 (“As a general rule, a conviction
will be found for immigration purposes where all of the following elements are present: (1) a judge or jury
has found the alien guilty or he has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient
facts to warrant a finding of guilty; (2) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or
restraint on the person’s liberty to be imposed (including but not limited to incarceration, probation, a fine
or restitution, or community-based sanctions such as a rehabilitation program, a work-release or study-
release program, revocation or suspension of a driver’s license, deprivation of nonessential activities or
privileges, or community service); and (3) a judgment or adjudication of guilt may be entered if the person
violates the terms of his probation or fails to comply with the requirements of the court’s order, without
availability of further proceedings regarding the person’s guilt or innocence of the original charge.”).
91. Cook, supra note 9, at 308.
92. Bruce Robert Marley, Comment, Exiling the New Felons: The Consequences of the Retroactive
Application of Aggravated Felony Convictions to Lawful Permanent Residents, 35 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 855, 867 (1998).
93. Cook, supra note 9, at 304.
94. INA § 101(a)(48)(A) (1998), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48) (2000) (“The term conviction means, with respect to
an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been
withheld, where—(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered
some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed.”).  This statutory
definition creates inconsistencies between state and federal law.  Certain adjudications not treated as
convictions by state law qualify as convictions for the purposes of the INA.  For a more in-depth discussion
of these inconsistencies see generally Morawetz, supra note 43, at 1942.
95. Marley, supra note 92, at 868.
96. Id. at 869.
97. IIRIRA § 322(a) (1996), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000).  While the IIRIRA certainly achieved its goal—
removing discretion from the hands of sentencing judges—it also created odd results.  An alien who is
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The IIRIRA also instituted harsh procedural changes with regard to the
aggravated felony provision. The IIRIRA mandated that all aggravated felons
be detained until deported.98  This meant that aggravated felons could remain
detained for years while awaiting the results of uncertain appeals.99  More im-
portantly, the aggravated felony provision, including the newly added offenses,
now applied retroactively.100  Thus, a conviction of one of the provision’s under-
lying offenses was now considered an aggravated felony even if the conviction
occurred before the enactment of the IIRIRA in 1996.101  As a result, the INS
began deporting lawful permanent residents because of minor crimes they had
committed long before the government defined these offenses as aggravated felo-
nies.102  For example, at age twenty-one, Alejandro Bontia was convicted of sex-
ual contact with a minor for having sex with his fifteen-year-old girlfriend.103
The girl’s mother became angry about the relationship and reported Mr. Bontia’s
conduct to the police.104  Nearly fifteen years later, Mr. Bontia faced separation
from his family, including his wife and child, for this “youthful dalliance.”105
Applying the aggravated felony provision retroactively also meant that
aliens who entered into plea bargains for lesser crimes to avoid deportation sud-
denly found themselves deportable as aggravated felons.  The case of Emma
Mendez De Hay, a twenty-year resident of the United States, illustrates this
point and also exemplifies the harsh effects of the IIRIRA’s detention provisions.
In 1990, someone called Ms. Mendez de Hay’s home looking for her Spanish-
speaking cousin.106  Her cousin told her to “tell [the caller] I can’t help him today.
I’ll help him tomorrow.”  The caller turned out to be an undercover narcotics
officer, and Ms. Mendez de Hay was charged with using a communication device
sentenced to eleven months imprisonment is not deportable as an aggravated felon.  In contrast, an alien
who enters a plea bargain for a one-year suspended sentence for the same offense is deportable.  Cook,
supra note 9, at 309. 
98. IIRIRA § 305, 8 U.S.C. § 1231.
99. Cook, supra note 9 at 311–12.
100. IIRIRA § 321(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).  The Supreme Court has long held that deportation is a civil
action; therefore, it does not qualify as criminal punishment.  Thus, the ex post facto clause found in
Article I of the Constitution, which applies only to criminal punishment, does not apply to deportation
statutes. See Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913).
101. IIRIRA § 321(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).
102. Cook, supra note 9, at 310.
103. Id. at 310 (citing Chris Hedges, Enforcement of Immigration Law Stirring Backlash, Call for
Change: Defenders Cite Drop In Drug-Related Crime, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 2, 2000, at
A39).
104. Id .
105. Id .
106. Cook, supra note 9, at 311 (citing Peggy Anderson, Immigrant Faces Deportation Under Tough INS
Laws, OREGONIAN, Feb. 14, 2000, at E7).
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to facilitate the distribution of cocaine.107  She agreed to plead guilty in exchange
for a promise that the government would not incarcerate or deport her.108  In
1996, as she returned from a trip with her fiance´ to Italy, the INS detained her
on the basis of the guilty plea.109  Shortly thereafter, the government shipped her
to a detention facility in Louisiana, far away from the home she shared with her
four children in Washington State.110  She was held in detention for five
months.111  After an arduous two-year struggle, the government finally lifted her
deportation order.112
In addition, the IIRIRA eliminated aggravated felons’ opportunity to seek
relief from deportation by eliminating the section 212(c) waiver of deporta-
tion.113  In its place, the IIRIRA created a form of relief called “cancellation of
removal.”114  This provision allows the attorney general to cancel deportation for
certain non-citizens,115 but it is not available to aggravated felons.116
The case of Antonio Cesar Chamorro exemplifies the harsh effects of repeal-
ing the waiver provisions.117  Mr. Chamorro was convicted of money launder-
ing.118  In 1993, he completed his three-and-one-half-year prison sentence.119
Because Mr. Chamorro had been a legal permanent resident since 1972, had
married a United States citizen, and had two sons, both born in the United
States, an immigration judge approved Mr. Chamorro’s request for a section
212(c) waiver of deportation.120  However, in 1997, an immigration judge
struck down the waiver pursuant to the 1996 laws, and Mr. Chamorro was
107. Id .
108. Id .
109. Id .
110. Id .
111. Id .
112. Cook, supra note 9, at 312 (citing Susan Gilmore, Mother Won’t Be Deported After All: ’92 Convic-
tion Had Left Her in Limbo, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 7, 2002, at A1).  The government lifted her order
after the Supreme Court decided that certain aliens could not be deported retroactively. Id.; see  INS v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S 289, 320–26 (2001).
113. Cook, supra note 9, at 312 (citing IIRIRA § 304(a) (1996), 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (2000)).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Cook, supra note 9, at 312 (citing Jo Ann Zuniga, Deportation Rules Break Up Families, INS Critics
Charge, HOUSTON CHRON., May 31, 1998, at 28).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 312–13.
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promptly deported to his native Chile.121  Shortly thereafter, his wife, who still
lived in the United States, filed for bankruptcy.122
The IIRIRA also created a provision for “expedited removal” of aggravated
felons.123  This provision allowed the attorney general to complete deportation
proceedings and any administrative appeals before the release of the aggravated
felon from prison.124  Finally, the IIRIRA stripped the courts of jurisdiction to
review orders of removal against aggravated felons.125
5. Other Immigration and Criminal Consequences of an
Aggravated Felony Conviction
Aggravated felons are also ineligible for several other forms of discretionary
relief.  They may not seek voluntary departure, which is a discretionary proce-
dure that enables an alien to depart the United States at the alien’s own expense
within a preset time frame, giving them time to tend to personal or financial
issues before departing the country.126  Congress has also made aggravated felons
ineligible for asylum.127  Lastly, lawful permanent residents convicted of an ag-
gravated felony are precluded from naturalizing—that is, becoming a U.S.
citizen.128
In addition to the harsh immigration consequences mentioned above, an ag-
gravated felony conviction may also have criminal consequences for the non-citi-
zen.  In pursuit of the American dream, or simply to rejoin his or her family,
some aliens attempt to surreptitiously re-enter the United States after being de-
ported.129  This is a crime and exposes the alien to serious criminal penalties
121. Id. at 313 (citing Jo Ann Zuniga, Deportation Rules Break Up Families, INS Critics Charge, HOUS-
TON CHRON., May 31, 1998, at 28).
122. Id.
123. IIRIRA § 304 (1996), 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (2000).
124. Id.
125. IIRIRA § 306(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of this bar to
judicial review in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).  The Court held that the IIRIRA did not deprive
federal courts of jurisdiction to review habeas petitions challenging deportation resulting from criminal
convictions. Id. at 313–14.  Congress subsequently passed the Real ID Act, which provides that a petition
for review (not a habeas petition) is a non-citizen’s only way into federal courts.  Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Habeas Corpus, 91 COR-
NELL L. REV. 459, 460 (2006).
126. See INA § 240B(a)(1) (1998), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(c)(1) (2000); Marley, supra note 92, at 881.
127. INA § 208(b)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i).
128. INA § 101(f)(8), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8).  Naturalization candidates must be of “good moral character” for a
period of five years before naturalizing.  INA § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a).  An aggravated felony con-
viction establishes a lack of “good moral character.”  INA § 101(f)(8), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8).
129. Robert James McWhirter, Hell Just Got Hotter: The Rings of Immigration Hell and the Immigra-
tion Consequences to Aliens Convicted of Crimes Revisited, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 507, 519 (1997).
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which are particularly harsh for aggravated felons, who could be sentenced to up
to twenty years in prison.130
In summary, the aggravated felony provision has undergone quite a trans-
formation since Congress added the term to the INA in 1988.  Congress has sig-
nificantly expanded the scope of the provision, principally by defining less serious
crimes as aggravated felonies.131  By changing the statutory definition of “convic-
tion” and “term of imprisonment,” Congress further broadened the scope of the
provision.132  At the same time, the consequences of an aggravated felony convic-
tion have become increasingly harsh.  They now include mandatory detention,
expedited removal, limited judicial review, ineligibility for most forms of discre-
tionary relief, and a lifetime ban from re-entering the country.133  Congress
made these harsh consequences even more potent by making the aggravated fel-
ony provision apply retroactively.134
6. The Severity of the Consequences for the Typical
Aggravated Felon Call for Lenity
The harsh consequences of an aggravated felony conviction seem especially
severe when one considers the characteristics of the typical alien charged as an
aggravated felon.  In 2006, the government charged over 11,300 aliens as aggra-
vated felons.135  Since 1997, the government has charged more than 156,700
aliens as aggravated felons.136  The majority of these aliens were long-time per-
manent residents of the United States, with an average length of residence of
fifteen years.137  These figures include aliens who, like Jose Guerrero, arrived at
a very young age and spent the better part of their lives in this country.  As Judge
Learned Hand noted, deportation of these individuals is the equivalent of per-
petual exile:
130. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2); McWhirter, supra note 129, at 519.  An alien apprehended attempting to reenter
the United States after being deported faces up to two years in prison.  8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).  Deported
aggravated felons who attempt to reenter, on the other hand, face up to twenty years in prison.  § 1326(b).
131. See supra Part I.C.
132. See supra notes 89–97 and accompanying text.
133. See supra Part I.C.
134. See supra notes 100–12 and accompanying text.
135. TRAC Immigration: How Often is the Aggravated Felony Statute Used?, http://trac.syr.edu/immigra-
tion/reports/158/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).   The actual number of aliens charged as aggravated felons
is most likely higher.  The government publishes no statistical data on the number of aliens who have been
charged, or actually deported, as aggravated felons.  Using data received under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, TRAC Immigration calculated the number of aliens charged as aggravated felons in immigra-
tion court.  These figures, however, reveal only a partial picture of the government’s use of the aggravated
felony provision.  Statistical data on the administrative use of the provision to bypass the immigration
court is currently unavailable. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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[W]e think it is not improper to say that deportation under the circum-
stances would be deplorable.  Whether the relator came here in arms or
at the age of ten, he is as much our product as though his mother had
borne him on American soil.  He knows no other language, no other
people, no other habits, than ours; he will be as much a stranger in
Poland as anyone borne of ancestors who immigrated in the seven-
teenth century.  However heinous his crimes, deportation is to him ex-
ile, a dreadful punishment, abandoned by the common consent of all
people.138
Given the extraordinarily harsh consequences of the aggravated felony pro-
vision, one might expect that courts would apply the rule of lenity to interpret
any ambiguities in the provision in the alien’s favor.  However, this has not been
the case and, indeed, quite the opposite has happened.  A number of courts have
interpreted at least one arguably ambiguous section of the aggravated felony pro-
vision against the alien.139
II. WHEN MISDEMEANORS ARE FELONIES:  CASES HOLDING THAT MISDEMEANOR
CONVICTIONS INVOLVING SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR MAY QUALIFY AS AN
AGGRAVATED FELONY
The INA defines the term “aggravated felony” by listing qualifying offenses
in twenty-one sub-paragraphs, each of which contains one or more of these quali-
fying offenses.140  Several of these sub-paragraphs refer to a specific provision of
the federal code—e.g., paragraph (I) refers to “an offense described in section
2251, 2252A, or 2252 of Title 18 (relating to child pornography).”141  Others
merely refer to a term of imprisonment—e.g., paragraph (G) refers to a theft or
burglary offense for which the “term of imprisonment is at least one year.”142
Other paragraphs are even more general.  Paragraph (M)(i) includes an offense
that “involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds
$10,000.”143  Congress undoubtedly chose this broad language to encompass a
wide range of federal and state offenses.144
However, the broad language used to define qualifying offenses led to inter-
pretative problems for courts.145  For example, paragraph (A) includes as an ag-
138. United States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630, 630 (2d Cir. 1926).
139. See  discussion infra Part II.
140. INA § 101(a)(43) (1998); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000).  The section provides: “The term ‘aggravated
felony’ means—(A) murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor; (B) illicit trafficking in a controlled sub-
stance. . . .” Id.
141. INA § 101(a)(43)(I); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(I).
142. INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).
143. INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).
144. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 11, at 567.
145. Id. at 568.
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gravated felony “sexual abuse of a minor.”146  Congress, however, provides no
definition for the term “sexual abuse of a minor” in the statute.147  Unlike other
paragraphs, there is no accompanying reference to another provision of the fed-
eral code or to a requisite term of imprisonment.148  As the BIA and the federal
courts have struggled to interpret the term, they have addressed the question of
whether the aggravated felony definition encompasses misdemeanor convictions
involving sexual abuse of a minor.
The Seventh Circuit confronted the issue in Guerrero-Perez v. INS.149
Guerrero, a Mexican national, entered the United States in 1979 when he was
just over two months old.150  Twenty years later, in 1999, Guerrero pled guilty
in an Illinois state court to “criminal abuse of a minor.”151  The criminal com-
plaint indicated that the nineteen-year-old Guerrero had engaged in sexual in-
tercourse with his fifteen-year-old girlfriend.152  The offense constituted a class A
misdemeanor under Illinois law, and Guerrero was sentenced to thirty days work
release and two years of sex-offender probation.153  He was then brought before
an immigration judge (“IJ”).154  The government took the position that Guerrero
had committed the aggravated felony of sexual abuse of a minor.155  Guerrero
argued that, because his conviction was for a class A misdemeanor and not a
felony, it should not be considered an aggravated felony.156  The IJ agreed with
the government.157  Guerrero appealed, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the IJ’s
decision, concluding that “Congress, since it did not specifically articulate that
aggravated felonies cannot be misdemeanors, intended to have the term aggra-
vated felony apply to a broad range of crimes listed in the statute, even if these
include misdemeanors.”158
Two weeks later, the BIA reached a contrary conclusion in In re Cram-
mond .159  Crammond had been convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse in a
California court, for which he was sentenced to ninety days in jail and three
146. INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A).
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. 242 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2001).
150. Id. at 728.
151. Id. at 730.
152. Id. 
153. Id.
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 729.
156. Id. at 731.
157. Id. at 728.
158. Id. at 737.
159. In re Crammond, 23 I. & N. Dec. 9 (B.I.A. 2001).
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years of probation.160  Under the California Penal Code, the conviction was con-
sidered a misdemeanor.161  Recognizing that the Seventh Circuit had recently
determined that the aggravated felony provision encompassed misdemeanor of-
fenses, the majority of the board members (eleven out of twenty) came to the exact
opposite conclusion.162  The BIA held that for an alien to be deportable, an aggra-
vated felony of sexual abuse of a minor must be a felony offense, not a misde-
meanor.163  To determine whether an alien has committed a felony offense, the
BIA held that courts should look to the federal definition of felony, i.e., an offense
for which the maximum term of imprisonment is at least one year.164  The maxi-
mum term of imprisonment for unlawful sexual intercourse in California did not
exceed one year and thus did not satisfy the federal definition of a felony and,
therefore, did not qualify as an aggravated felony.165
Based on Crammond, Guerrero asked the Seventh Circuit to reconsider its
decision.166  The court refused, stating that “[w]e cannot adopt the approach that
a splintered majority of the Board in Crammond supports.”  The court found
that it had previously considered and rejected the positions articulated by the
majority in Crammond167 and therefore concluded that this case did not war-
rant vacating its decision in Guerrero-Perez.168
Shortly thereafter, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits both had occasion to ad-
dress the issue.169  Employing similar reasoning as the Seventh Circuit, both
courts concluded that the aggravated felony of sexual abuse of a minor included
misdemeanor convictions involving sexual abuse of a minor.170  The BIA, then,
in In re Small, deferred to the Seventh Circuit’s view, stating “[w]e consider it
160. Id. at 10.
161. Id. at 16–17. The California statute under which Crammond was convicted stated “[a]ny person who
engages in an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than
the perpetrator is guilty of either a misdemeanor or a felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment in a
county jail not exceeding one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison.” Id . at 16 (citing CA. PENAL
CODE § 261.5(c) (West 1998)).  The state court reduced his conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor.
Id. at 16–17.
162. Crammond, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 14–15.
163. Id. at 15.
164. Id. at 15–16.
165. Id. at 16–17. The BIA eventually vacated the decision for lack of jurisdiction after learning that Cram-
mond departed the country while the decision was pending. Crammond, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 180.
166. Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 256 F.3d 546, 546 (7th Cir. 2001).
167. Id. at 547.
168. Id. 
169. See  United States v. Gonzales-Vela, 276 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Marin-Navarette,
244 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2001).
170. Gonzales-Vela, 276 F.3d at 768; Marin-Navarette, 244 F.3d at 1287.
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appropriate at this juncture to accede to the weight of the appellate court author-
ity in the interest of uniform application of the immigration laws.”171
III. WHY MISDEMEANOR CONVICTIONS INVOLVING SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AGGRAVATED FELONIES
In Guerrero-Perez, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals made three
points to support its conclusion that misdemeanor convictions may constitute the
aggravated felony of sexual abuse of a minor for purposes of the INA.172  First,
the court noted that sexual abuse of a minor is grouped with rape and murder,
indicating that Congress considered sexual abuse of a minor a very serious of-
fense.173  Given the gravity of the offense, the court asserted, Congress must have
intended the aggravated felony of sexual abuse of a minor to include a broad
range of crimes, including misdemeanors.174  Second, the court found that the
structure of the aggravated felony provision created a definition section that
emptied the term “aggravated felony” of its plain meaning.175  Third, the court
held that, because the aggravated felony provision failed to expressly exclude mis-
demeanor convictions, Congress must have intended to include them.176
The plain meaning of the terms “aggravated” and “felony,” however, as well
as the legislative history of the aggravated felony provision clearly indicate that
Congress intended the aggravated felony of sexual abuse of a minor to include
only felony convictions.  Moreover, in two recent decisions, the Supreme Court
has used an ordinary meaning approach in interpreting the scope of the aggra-
vated felony provision.177  Applying this approach to the sub-paragraph that ad-
dresses sexual abuse of a minor in the IIRIRA leads to one conclusion:
misdemeanor convictions of sexual abuse of a minor do not qualify as aggravated
felonies.
A. A Critique of the Seventh Circuit’s Arguments for Including
Misdemeanors as Aggravated Felonies
1. Structural Arguments
The Guererro court held that by grouping sexual abuse of a minor with
rape and murder, Congress intended the definition of sexual abuse of a minor to
include misdemeanor convictions.178  The court noted that, prior to 1996, para-
171. In re Small, 23 I. & N. Dec. 448, 450 (B.I.A. 2002).
172. Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727, 727 (7th Cir. 2001).
173. Id. at 736.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 737.
177. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004); Lopez v. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 625 (2006).
178. Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727, 736 (7th Cir. 2001).
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graph (A) of the aggravated felony provision covered only one offense, murder.179
With the enactment of the IIRIRA, Congress broadened paragraph (A) to also
include rape and sexual abuse of a minor.180  The court held that grouping rape
and sexual abuse of a minor with murder suggests that Congress considered these
offenses to be of similar severity and import.181  Thus, the argument goes,
“grouping sexual abuse of a minor with these two acts, without explicitly limiting
sexual abuse of a minor to the status of a misdemeanor, is a fairly strong indica-
tion . . . that Congress intended both misdemeanor and felony convictions for
sexual abuse of a minor to be considered aggravated felonies.”182
The grouping of sexual abuse of a minor with murder and rape, however,
seems to cut the other way.  Murder and rape are almost universally recognized
as felonies.183  Thus, the inclusion of sexual abuse of a minor alongside these
terms suggests that Congress intended to encompass only felony offenses involving
sexual abuse of a minor.184
The Guerrero court also held that by placing the term aggravated felony
within quotation marks, Congress stripped the term of its ordinary meaning.  As
stated above, Congress chose not to explicitly define the term “aggravated fel-
ony.”185  Instead, the statute reads:  “The term ‘aggravated felony’ means” and
then lists offenses to be considered aggravated felonies.186  By placing the term
“aggravated felony” in quotation marks followed by the word “means,” the court
contended, Congress created a definition section.187  In other words, Congress
stripped the term “aggravated felony” of its ordinary meaning, and supplied a
new definition, which consisted of the offenses listed in paragraphs A through
U.188  The court held that Congress could have used a number of terms to define
the offenses covered in the aggravated felony provision.189  As the court stated,
“[Congress] could have substituted the term ‘aggravated felony’ for a myriad of
phrases, including: (1) aggravated offense; (2) bad acts, and (3) aggravated
crimes.”  The court held that, “although this list is hypothetical, it exemplifies that
Congress had the discretion to use whatever term it pleased and define the term
as it deemed appropriate.”190
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See In re Small, 23 I. & N. Dec. 448, 455 (B.I.A. 2002) (Rosenberg, Bd. Member, dissenting).
184. See id.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 140–49.
186. Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727, 736–37 (7th Cir. 2001).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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But, of course, Congress did not use the term “aggravated offense,” “bad act,”
or “aggravated crimes.”  It chose the term “aggravated felony.”191  And, as the
Supreme Court has stated, “[t]he legislative purpose is presumed to be expressed
by the ordinary meaning of the words used.”192  The fact that Congress chose the
term “aggravated felony,” as opposed to a more generic term, suggests that Con-
gress intended the term to encompass only felony offenses.193
2. Congress’s Failure to Exclude Misdemeanors Means
Congress Intended to Include Them
The Guerrero court also noted that the aggravated felony provision does not
state that only felony offenses qualify as aggravated felonies.194  Thus, the court
held, because Congress did not specifically articulate that misdemeanors cannot be
aggravated felonies, Congress intended the term aggravated felony to apply to a
broad range of crimes, including misdemeanors.195  The Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals made a similar argument in Marin-Navarette, holding that because
Congress failed to include a reference to a term of imprisonment for sexual abuse
of a minor offenses, Congress intended the term to apply to a broad range of
offenses, including misdemeanors.196
This approach, however, overlooks the principle of statutory interpretation
that a definition of a term should be read to exclude any meaning that is not
stated.197  Accordingly, because Congress failed to provide that aggravated felo-
nies include misdemeanors, courts should not read “including misdemeanors” into
the aggravated felony provision.198  When Congress wished to expand other
paragraphs of the aggravated felony provision to include misdemeanors, it did so
expressly—for example, paragraphs (F), (G), and (H) impose a sentence require-
ment of “at least one year,” thus encompassing misdemeanor offenses for which a
term of imprisonment of one year may be imposed.199  To state that Congress
intended to include misdemeanor offenses by not including a term of imprison-
ment is to mistake the exception for the rule, and overlooks the longstanding rule
of statutory interpretation that a definition of a term should be read to exclude
any meaning that is not stated.
191. INA § 101(a)(43) (1998), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000).
192. See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984).
193. See In re Crammond, 23 I. & N. Dec. 9, 15 (B.I.A. 2001).
194. Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727, 737 (7th Cir. 2001).
195. Id.
196. United States v. Marin-Navarette, 244 F.3d 1284, 1286 (2001).
197. See Crammond, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 22 (Rosenberg, Bd. Member, concurring) (citing Stenberg v. Car-
hart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000).
198. See id.
199. See id. at 25.
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B. Arguments in Favor of Excluding Misdemeanor Offenses
1. Plain Language and Legislative History
Any attempt to include misdemeanor offenses as aggravated felonies requires
a complete circumvention of the well-established meaning of the terms “aggra-
vated” and “felony.”  A felony refers to a serious crime and is distinguishable from
a misdemeanor.200  Felonies have traditionally been defined as offenses punisha-
ble by imprisonment of more than one year.201  The term “aggravated” typically
modifies other words, and suggests a situation that is “worse, enhanced or more
severe in some manner.”202  The two terms together suggest a very serious offense
punishable by more than one year in prison.  As Judge Straub stated:
[I]t is quite clear that an “aggravated felony” defines a subset of the
broader category “felony.”  Common sense and standard English gram-
mar dictate that when an adjective—such as “aggravated”—modifies a
noun—such as felony—the combination of the terms delineates a subset
of a noun.  One would never suggest, for example, that by adding the
adjective “blue” to the noun “car,” one could be attempting to define
items that are not, in the first instance, cars.  In other words, based on
the plain meaning of the terms “aggravated” and “felony,” we should
presume that the specifics that follow in the definition of “aggravated
felony” under INA § 101(a)(43) serve to elucidate what makes these
particular felonies “aggravated”; we certainly should not presume that
those specifics would include offenses that are not felonies at all.203
The history of the aggravated felony provision further buttresses the argu-
ment that Congress intended the term to encompass only felony offenses.  When
Congress created the term “aggravated felony,” in 1988, as part of the ADAA, it
also made other changes to the INA.204  For example, Congress revised former
Section 242(a) to require the attorney general to take custody of “any alien con-
victed of an aggravated felony” and ordered that “the Attorney General shall not
release such felon from custody.”205  Further, Congress added a new Section
242A to the INA aimed at expediting the deportation of aliens convicted of ag-
200. See id. at 23–24 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 633 (7th ed. 1999)).
201. See id. (citing United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 792–93 (3d Cir. 1999)); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 (2005).
202. See Crammond, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 22 (Rosenberg, Bd. Member, concurring) (citing BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 65 (7th ed. 1999)).
203. United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 157 (2000) (Straub, J., dissenting).  This case involved subpara-
graphs (F) and (G), which relate to a crime of violence and a theft or burglary offense, respectively.  The
issue in the case was whether a misdemeanor conviction of either type of crime qualified as an aggravated
felony. Id .
204. See Crammond, 23 I. & N. Dec. 9, 23 (B.I.A. 2001) (Filppu, Bd. Member, concurring).
205. Id. at 18 (citing ADAA § 7342 (1988), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000)).
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gravated felonies.206  The new section provided that “[w]ith respect to an alien
convicted of an aggravated felony who is taken into custody by the Attorney Gen-
eral . . . the Attorney General shall, to the maximum extent practicable, detain
any such felon at a facility at which other such aliens are detained.”207  Despite
the frequent changes to the aggravated felony provision, the reference to “such
felon” has never been changed.208   In addition, former Section 212(c) prohibited
an alien who was “convicted of one or more aggravated felonies and has served
for such felony or felonies  a term of imprisonment of at least 5 years” from
receiving a waiver of deportation.209  These references suggest that Congress in-
tended the aggravated felony provision to apply only to felony offenses.210
2. Recent Supreme Court Decisions Support Excluding
Misdemeanor Offenses
In two decisions decided after Guerrero , the Supreme Court took an ordi-
nary meaning approach in defining two other subparagraphs of the aggravated
felony provision.211  This approach is hard to square with the Guerrero court’s
creative parsing of the aggravated felony provision.  In Leocal v. Ashcroft, the
Court, in a unanimous opinion, held that the aggravated felony of “crime of
violence” does not include the offense of driving under the influence.212  The INA
defines “crime of violence” as “an offense that has as an element the use . . . of
physical force.”213  In analyzing whether driving under the influence involved
the use of physical force, the Court stated that the ordinary, natural meaning of
the word “use” involves more than negligent or accidental conduct, such as injur-
ing someone while driving under the influence.214  The Court stated that “when
interpreting a statute, we must give the words their ‘ordinary and natural’
meaning.”215
206. Id. (citing ADAA § 7347(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1228).
207. Id.
208. See id.
209. See Crammond, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 13 (citing INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 1996))
(alteration in original).
210. See id.  To further buttress the argument for excluding misdemeanors, others have cited Section
237(a)(2)(e) of the INA, which provides that “any alien who at any time after admission is convicted of a
crime of . . . child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment is deportable.”  INA § 237(a)(2)(E) (2000), 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E) (2000).  This section would appear to cover minor sexual abuse offenses, sug-
gesting that Congress intended “sexual abuse of a minor” under section 101(a)(43)(A) to be limited to more
serious felony offenses. Crammond, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 13.
211. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004); Lopez v. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 625 (2006).
212. Leocal , 534 U.S. at 12.
213. 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2000).
214. Leocal , 534 U.S. at 9.
215. Id. 
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The Court applied a similar approach in its eight-to-one decision in Lopez
v. Gonzales.216  In Lopez, the Court held that the aggravated felony of “drug
trafficking” does not include state felony convictions for simple possession of a
controlled substance.217  The Court noted that the ordinary, natural meaning of
the term “trafficking” involves commercial dealing, which is not an element of a
garden-variety possession conviction.218  The Court expressed a preference for
using the ordinary meaning of statutory language in the absence of a clear indi-
cation from Congress to do otherwise.219  Justice Souter stated that “Humpty
Dumpty used a word to mean ‘just what [he chose] it to mean—neither more nor
less,’ and legislatures, too, are free to be unorthodox.  Congress can define an
aggravated felony of illicit trafficking in an unexpected way.  But Congress
would need to tell us so.”220
Leocal and Lopez clearly illustrate the Supreme Court’s preference for giv-
ing the language of the aggravated felony provision its ordinary, plain meaning.
Such an approach certainly suggests that only a felony may qualify as an aggra-
vated felony, unless Congress clearly states otherwise.  The Seventh Circuit’s cre-
ative arguments in Guerrero for reading the “aggravated felony” provision to
include misdemeanor offenses—e.g., that the use of quotation marks drains the
terms of their natural meaning—do not constitute a clear indication on the part
of Congress to strip the term of its ordinary meaning.
3. The Rule of Lenity Supports a Narrow Reading of the
Provision
In light of the tenuous arguments for including misdemeanors as aggravated
felonies, it is difficult to imagine how a court could conclude that including mis-
demeanors is not only a possible interpretation of the statute, but the narrowest
possible interpretation.  If anything, the aggravated felony provision is ambigu-
ous as to whether misdemeanors qualify as aggravated felonies.  In that case, the
courts should have applied the rule of lenity, and interpreted section
101(a)(43)(A) in the manner least prejudicial to the alien—i.e., as excluding mis-
demeanors involving sexual abuse of a minor.221
216. 127 S. Ct. 625 (2006).
217. Id. at 633.
218. Id. at 630.
219. Id. 
220. Id.
221. The majority in In re Crammond believed the statute was ambiguous and applied the rule of lenity.  23
I. & N. Dec. 9, 15 (B.I.A. 2001).  Other members found that there was no need to resort to the rule of
lenity as the plain language of the statute made it perfectly clear that misdemeanors could not qualify as
aggravated felonies. Id. at 17 (Filppu, Bd. Member, concurring).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Under the INA, a non-citizen who commits an aggravated felony is deport-
able and barred from ever re-entering the country.222  Often, the aliens who
have been deported as aggravated felons, like Jose Guerrero, have spent the bet-
ter part of their lives in the United States and have strong ties to the United
States.223  Given the harsh consequences of the aggravated felony provision, it is
unlikely that Congress intended to include misdemeanor convictions involving
sexual abuse of a minor as aggravated felonies.  Although three circuit courts and
a reluctant BIA have held the opposite, they have done so by relying on argu-
ments that are tenuous at best.  In addition, the plain language of the aggravated
felony provision, coupled with the provision’s legislative history, supports the
contrary position—namely, that the aggravated felony of sexual abuse of a minor
does not include misdemeanors.  Moreover, the Supreme Court has applied an
ordinary meaning approach in defining the scope of the aggravated felony provi-
sion in two recent decisions, which precludes the creative parsing of the statute by
the circuit courts.  Finally, the rule of lenity, which calls for the reading of depor-
tation statutes in the light most favorable to the alien, further buttresses the
narrower interpretation of the provision.  For these reasons, courts addressing
this issue in the future should find that the aggravated felony of sexual abuse of a
minor does not include misdemeanor offenses.
222. INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) (1998), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii) (2000).
223. See supra Part I.C.6.
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